We Lost the Fourth
A community case file on the Securly Pass digital hall-pass system already live in our schools — what it tracks, who it affects, and how to stop it.
A trip to the bathroom shouldn't require a case file.
Securly Pass (formerly e-hallpass) is already in use at West Essex High School and West Essex Middle School — and right now it is logging every student's movement, timing bathroom breaks, and flagging "suspicious" activity with an algorithm. Because of the backlash, the school board is meeting to decide whether to keep it. Below is the sourced evidence, plus a direct way to put your objection on record at both schools before that decision.
remaining
Start here — the damage is already happeningSecurly Pass is live at West Essex High School and West Essex Middle School right now. It is not a proposal and it is not a drill: the system is logging your child's every pass request, destination, timed bathroom trip, and automated "behavioral flag" on a company-owned database, paid for out of the school budget. Below is the full picture — the day-to-day damage to students, the legal exposure for parents, the fine print in Securly's own contracts (quoted directly in this section), and the money trail that ends at your tax bill. Pick the option that matters to you, but read the fine print either way.
Read it in order, or jump straight to the page for students, parents, or the bathroom-pass limits. Every claim below links to its source.
Just switched on — and classrooms felt it immediately A brand-new pass system, dropped into every classroom
This isn't an old program getting a new coat of paint. Securly Pass just went live at West Essex High School and West Essex Middle School — passed and switched on with no pilot, no parent vote, and no opt-out — and teachers and students are now learning a whole new ritual on each other, in real time, every period of every day. The rollout itself is interrupting the school day.
No pilot. No parent notice. No opt-out.
The problem: students and teachers were handed a new approval dashboard, a countdown timer, and a new set of rules all at once. Every classroom is now a test site, and the students inside it are the test subjects — while the adults in the building are still learning the software themselves.
What that means in practice: until everyone clicks through the system flawlessly — which no one does in week one — confusion, mistakes, and friction are the normal state of the school day, not the exception.
The reality: when a brand-new system like this is switched on without a pilot, the school day is interrupted by the rollout itself.
Teachers are pausing class to fiddle with the computer.
The problem: a pass request is no longer a glance and a word. The student fills in the class, the destination, and the reason; the teacher has to stop teaching, walk to the computer or tablet, open the approval dashboard, accept the request — and later remember to close it when the student returns. Multiply that by every request in every room, and a big part of every period is now spent feeding the system.
The vendors pitch "fewer class interruptions" — but students at a school already running this kind of system describe the reality as "literally a whole process" that ends with waiting for the teacher to accept the request, and a commenter there called it "more confusing, very laggy, and in general just unusable — even the teachers would rather do a paper pass."
The reality: in classrooms where the Wi-Fi dips, the dashboard is busy, or the teacher is mid-sentence, the whole room loses momentum — not just the student asking for the pass.
The old pass forgot you by the end of the day. This one never will.
The problem: the old system needed no database. The student asked — or raised a hand — left, and came back in a reasonable amount of time; a teacher who noticed a pattern dealt with it directly, face to face. Or, on a paper log or whiteboard, the student wrote the time out and the time back, and the sheet was cleared by the end of the day.
That is still how most of the country does it: EdSurge notes the written hall pass "probably hasn't changed much since schools were first created" and that "the vast majority of schools still use pen and paper." And even in New York City schools paying for SmartPass, reporters found "students and teachers are still resorting to the classic technique of raising hands for permission and using old-fashioned hall passes."
The reality: the old systems' records disappeared daily because they were never records at all. The new one logs every request to a company-owned server and keeps it — timed, scored, and searchable. This wasn't a fix for a broken system; it replaced a system that forgot you with a system built never to forget you.
How the pass system used to work
- Ask or raise a hand; leave; return within a reasonable time.
- Or sign out on paper or a whiteboard: time out, time back.
- The sheet was cleared at the end of the day — no data file ever existed.
- A teacher who saw abuse handled it directly with the student.
- Nothing was scored by an algorithm or shared with a company.
How the new system works
- Every request, destination, and duration is saved to a database.
- Timers, automated flags, and "behavioral" scoring run with no human decision.
- Records persist for years — past graduation, with no easy deletion.
- Encounter data decides which classmates you're allowed to meet in a hallway.
- A "hall monitor" view shows every active pass to any teacher or staff member.
They didn't fix the hall pass. They replaced a piece of paper that forgot you by the end of the day with a company database built to never forget you at all.
Sources: EdSurge — The School Hall Pass Is Going Digital. Is That a Good Thing? · The Charge (PHS) — Everything Wrong With the E-Hall Pass · NY Post — NYC schools' digital hall-pass backlash · Gothamist — New Digital Hall Passes Track Bathroom Breaks · Securly's own terms
For students What the pass system does to your school day
This is the student-specific case file: the disruptions, the false flags, and the health risks. If you are a student, this page was built for you.
For students: severe disruptions & loss of rights
Students face immediate, everyday obstacles to their health and their education under a digital tracking framework.
Bathroom breaks become a "time trial."
The problem: Securly Pass logs the exact duration a student is out of the room. Schools that set strict limits — 7 or 8 minutes — turn a trip to a distant bathroom into a high-stress sprint.
What if a student has a medical emergency, or needs extra time for menstrual needs? Under a strict digital timeline, they can be flagged as "suspicious" or sent to detention for running out of time.
The reality: tracking basic human needs this way induces real anxiety and strips students of ordinary dignity.
No device, no pass — even to go get a device.
The problem: Securly is built into the school device. If a student's laptop is dead or left at home, they can't log in to generate a pass.
What if a student arrives without their computer and needs a pass to go get a loaner from the library? They can't create a digital pass to fetch the laptop, because they don't have the laptop yet.
The reality: the system assumes every piece of technology works perfectly, 100% of the time, and punishes students when it doesn't.
Trapped at your desk during a locked exam.
The problem: During high-stakes testing, computers go into "locked-down" mode, or the teacher's approval dashboard is fully occupied.
What if a student has a nosebleed, an upset stomach, or an anxiety attack mid-test? Because the screen is frozen on the exam, they can't reach the pass system at all — and exiting the testing browser can itself trigger a cheating flag.
A dropped connection becomes a disciplinary record.
The problem: Like any cloud software, Securly Pass suffers from network congestion and lag.
What if the school Wi-Fi dips while a pass is spinning? A student leaves anyway, and the system flags them as having left without permission, resulting in unnecessary disciplinary action.
The reality: as covered in reporting and IT-forum discussions, inevitable digital glitches and connectivity failures add immense frustration to the school day.
"Fewer bathroom trips" isn't a win — it's a warning sign.
The problem: some teachers and many administrators celebrate the drop in students asking to use the restroom as proof the system is working. But many students say the opposite is happening — they must hold it in, or they're too scared to go anywhere because they can't figure out how to use the pass, don't want to be timed, or fear being flagged for a routine bathroom break.
The medical reality: holding urine or stool too long can lead to urinary retention or fecal impaction, which often results in loss of control known as urinary incontinence, fecal incontinence, or encopresis. Over time, students can develop many of these issues: [1][2][3]
- Urinary retention — the bladder can't fully empty.
- Fecal impaction — hardened stool blocks the bowel.
- Urinary incontinence — loss of bladder control.
- Fecal incontinence — loss of bowel control.
- Encopresis — soiling caused by backed-up stool.
- Urinary tract infections (UTIs) from holding urine too long.
- Chronic constipation and painful bowel movements.
- Bladder and kidney strain that can become long-term.
- Anxiety around a basic bodily need, hurting focus and mental health.
The reality: an extremely high majority of students could be at risk of these entirely preventable problems if they're too scared to use the restroom — or simply can't get a pass. A system that makes kids hold it in is a health risk, not a success story. [1] Hopkins Medicine · [2] Mayo Clinic · [3] What Happens If You Hold Your Pee In For Too Long
The computer gets to decide who you're allowed to meet.
The problem: Securly Pass lets administrators build "encounter blocks" that restrict which students can leave a room at the same time or meet in a hallway. Cross paths with a blocked student anyway and the system can raise an alert — even if it was an accident.
What if the person you walk to class with, or your only friend in the building, is on a block list? Every hall pass you make becomes a potential violation for simply existing near them.
The reality: a staff dashboard decides which relationships look "suspicious." No student sees the list, no student can appeal it, and nobody explains why.
One glitch can follow you for the rest of the year.
The problem: "false flags" happen when the algorithm misreads a normal trip as suspicious — a long line at the nurse's office, a forgotten sign-out, a dropped Wi-Fi connection.
What if the flag leads to detention, a phone call home, or a discipline file? The record sits in a vendor database tied to your name, with no hearing, no review, and no way to see it — let alone erase it.
The reality: students and teachers alike report these alerts; many simply stop asking to leave the room at all, which is exactly the health crisis covered above.
How often you go reveals what's happening in your body.
The problem: Pass logs every restroom trip, its length, and how often you make them. Frequency patterns are a direct window into health: UTIs, diabetes, IBS, menstrual cycles, even pregnancy.
What if a staff member reads the dashboard and sees a student who visits the bathroom every period, or after lunch, and interprets it — or shares it. There is no medical training required to view these logs. The U.S. Student Privacy Policy Office warns districts to think hard about sensitive Student Information before handing it to vendors.
The reality: the privacy policy's own data collection language and the technical analysis in the AdColony video show apps like this can accumulate deeply sensitive health-adjacent data with no guardrails.
A machine decides if you're anxious, depressed, or dangerous.
The problem: Securly's privacy policy says its tools "may identify potential signs of anxiety, depression, cyberbullying, self-harm, and potential violence" from your online activity — and Pass check-ins can record "how a Student is feeling."
What if the algorithm is wrong? A false "self-harm" hotline call to your parents, or a false "violence" alert to the office, can change your life — and the policy admits the tooling flags these things, not counselors. CDT's research shows the chilling effect this has on students.
The reality: there is no psychologist-in-the-loop requirement in the privacy policy. For students who are actually struggling, an automated flag is the coldest possible response.
Your chats, posts, and messages can be read.
The problem: per Securly's privacy policy, monitoring services can collect "the contents of emails, blog posts, and messages" and "student/teacher chats" on school-issued devices.
What if you vent to a friend about your home life, a fight with your parents, or your crush — and a staff dashboard surfaces it out of context? Words meant for one person become a data point for a screen.
The reality: "I have nothing to hide" stops being the argument once you realize every private thought typed on that device can be logged and reviewed.
Who you pass, where, and when — recorded forever.
The problem: the Washington Post's investigation into e-hallpass showed the data includes when you leave, where you go, how long you're gone, and who you might meet. Lawyers call this a "pattern of life" profile.
What if police, divorce attorneys, or another family's lawsuit subpoena the records? Your hallway movements from three years ago — built from bathroom passes — become evidence in a proceeding you didn't cause. The Washington Post investigation
The reality: a district lawsuit in Oregon already alleges a digital hall-pass system "systematically monitored human movements" to build "psychological patterns." That is where this data goes.
Your bathroom trip costs everyone their momentum.
The problem: every pass requires a teacher to stop teaching, open a dashboard, approve, and sometimes watch a timer. Multiply that by dozens of requests a day.
What if you're the student at the back of the room during a hard lesson and the person in front of you needs a pass? The interruption resets the entire class — your learning time is collateral damage in someone else's approval queue.
The reality: this is not incidental — it is the design. See the chart below: minutes lost per period are absorbed by every student in the room, every day.
One school day. Three passes. Do the math.
Here at West Essex, Securly Pass is set to allow only three hall passes per day — and every reason for leaving the room counts against the same three: the bathroom, the locker, the nurse, the library, a loaner laptop, a worksheet, or a project sitting in another teacher's room.
passes allowed for the whole day — bathroom included
hours per school day (395 minutes) with no reset
bathroom trips left after three ordinary educational errands
A completely normal day, using passes exactly as intended
| When | What the student legitimately needs | Pass used |
|---|---|---|
| Period 2 | A worksheet was left in another teacher's room — the student goes to pick it up | 1 of 3 |
| Period 4 | The assigned laptop is dead — the student goes to the library for a loaner | 2 of 3 |
| Period 5 | Project materials for sixth period are still in the locker | 3 of 3 |
| Periods 6–9 | Bathroom. Nurse. Water. Anything at all. | Denied — no passes left |
That student did nothing wrong and used every pass for education — yet from mid-morning to the end of a 6-hour-35-minute school day, the bathroom is simply unavailable. On an ordinary day with fewer errands, the math still means at best one bathroom break in the entire day — and for many students, none.
Now the body's side of the math. Urologists at the Cleveland Clinic say going about seven times a day is average, with a normal range up to 10 times — roughly every 2–4 waking hours for most people. A student told to wait four hours, five hours, or the full 395 minutes isn't being taught discipline; their bladder and kidneys are being used as a storage unit. For the many West Essex students who menstruate, or who live with diabetes, bladder or bowel conditions, or take certain medications, waiting that long isn't uncomfortable — it is medically the wrong call, and the school never asked.
Option A — hold it in: urgency, pain, and distraction now; urinary retention, bladder and bowel control problems, UTIs, incontinence, and encopresis later. The medical sources are linked below — this is a real, documented consequence, not a scare line.
Option B — skip the errand: no worksheet, no loaner laptop, no project materials, no tutorial. A student who "follows the rules" can fall behind simply because the pass budget ran out before a need they couldn't schedule.
A system that forces students to choose between their bladder and their education isn't a safety tool — it's a rationing system for basic human needs.
Sources: Cleveland Clinic — How Often Should You Pee During the Day? · Hopkins Medicine — Bladder & Bowel Dysfunction · Mayo Clinic — Encopresis
Guilt by proximity
Securly Pass can flag students who happen to be in the hallway, or a nearby bathroom, at the same time as someone else the system is already watching. Students end up mathematically accused of "unauthorized socializing" simply for bad timing.
The expired-timer anxiety attack
A countdown timer, often set to 7–8 minutes, appears on a student's screen the moment they leave. An upset stomach or a medical flare-up runs out that clock and triggers an automatic flag for truancy, with real embarrassment attached.
The forgotten sign-in trap
If a teacher gets busy and forgets to click "end pass" when a student returns, the timer keeps ticking. The student is falsely logged as gone for hours, and can then be blocked from a later, legitimate pass request — even a trip to the nurse.
The "loner laptop" catch-22, again
A student whose laptop is dead, left at home, or locked inside a secure testing browser cannot request a pass at all — including the pass they'd need to go borrow a working device.
For parents & guardians What the pass system does to your child — and to you
The parent-specific case file: liability, privacy, the money, and the health consequences. If you are a parent or guardian, this page was built for you.
For parents & guardians: liability, privacy, and well-being
These systems compromise data privacy, complicate learning, and can put physical health at risk — often without parents ever being told.
When bathroom trips are policed, kids stop asking.
The problem: Heavily monitored, restricted bathroom trips lead some students to stop asking to go at all.
The consequence: students have reported dehydrating themselves through the day to avoid the tracking and the embarrassment of requesting a digital pass, raising the real risk of bladder issues and urinary tract infections. No school should implement a system that incentivizes children to avoid drinking water.
Your child's movement data, stored indefinitely.
The problem: Digital hall-pass apps collect intimate data on a child's daily physical behavior, location, movement frequency, and social patterns, often stored on third-party servers with no clear end date.
The consequence: parents nationwide are fighting back in court. A major lawsuit was filed in Oregon against a district's digital hall-pass system, alleging it infringed on parental privacy and systematically monitored human movements to create "psychological patterns." Securly itself settled a class-action lawsuit alleging unauthorized tracking of students' location and video-viewing data. Read the coverage in THE Journal
From educator to warden.
The problem: Surveillance software shifts a teacher's role from instructor to gatekeeper of a monitoring dashboard.
The consequence: the Center for Democracy & Technology found that intense student-monitoring tools take a real mental-health toll, creating a "chilling effect" that erodes trust between students and the adults around them. Read the CDT research
Your money buys the surveillance, then pays to defend it.
The problem: the district licenses Securly Pass with public money — local taxes and state/federal aid that otherwise buy teachers, books, and buildings. You are literally funding the tracking of your own children.
The consequence: when the tracking ends up in court, the same taxpayers pay again. Bloomberg Law reports Securly agreed to pay an undisclosed sum to settle the school-spying class action — and districts nationwide carry the legal fees and premium increases in their public budgets. Bloomberg Law · THE Journal
COPPA was supposed to protect young children. Here, the district signs for them.
The problem: Securly's own agreement language says the school "acknowledges that You are authorized to consent to Securly's collection, use and disclosure of Minor User Data related to minors under 13 years old, and by agreeing to these Terms, You grant Your consent."
The consequence: for elementary and middle-schoolers up to 13, the district — not the parent — grants the consent that federal COPPA rules are designed to give you. FTC: COPPA Rule · Securly terms page
You have no direct right to see it, fix it, or erase it.
The problem: Securly's privacy policy says it "will honor requests from Schools to access, correct, or delete" student information — and tells parents to "contact your School." There is no parent portal request, no individual deletion right.
The consequence: if you want your child's records removed, you must persuade the district to ask the vendor. Retention is the default while the contract runs; "de-identified" copies can be kept and shared afterward. Securly Privacy Policy
"Hosting" providers and "research" partners get access.
The problem: Securly's privacy policy discloses disclosure to "third-party vendors, service providers, contractors, or agents," including "hosting" providers, and says it "may also use and share aggregate or de-identified Student data with third parties for research and analytical purposes."
The consequence: your child's bathroom- and movement-records are processed in private data centers you'll never tour, run by companies you've never approved, and subsets can flow to unnamed "research" partners. De-identified data is routinely re-identifiable, as privacy researchers have shown again and again. EFF: Student Privacy
Your contact details can be joined to your child's records and used for promotions.
The problem: the privacy policy says parent information — phone number, student name, school, and location — can be used, "subject to our contracts with Schools, [to] provide news, special offers, promotions, and other information we think may interest you," and that "Parent and Educator Information is often combined with Student Information."
The consequence: the same vendor that times your child's bathroom breaks may also be building a promotional list that includes your family. Opting out of email marketing does not remove the underlying record. Securly Privacy Policy
Kids' records are hacked at industrial scale.
The problem: more than 62 million U.S. students have had school-related records compromised, driven by massive single events — PowerSchool, Instructure/Canvas, and others. Education vendors are a favorite target: schools hold sensitive data and are chronically underfunded for security.
The consequence: every additional vendor holding every bathroom trip and movement log for every student widens the blast radius. If Securly's data centers are breached, there is no do-over for a child's private history — it is copied, not returned. Security.org · K-12 Dive · UpGuard
An undisclosed payout over "collected and sold" location and video data.
The problem: parents sued Securly alleging it collected and sold student location and video-viewing data without authorization; Bloomberg Law reported Securly agreed to pay an undisclosed sum to end the suit — a settlement, not an admission, but a payment nonetheless.
The consequence: the company that tracks your child has already written a check over the very practices parents are worried about. State legislators and student newsrooms — including New Jersey's CHS Courier — keep raising the same concerns as rollouts expand. Bloomberg Law · K-12 Dive · CHS Courier (NJ)
When something goes wrong, who's liable? You'll be arguing with the school board.
The problem: under FERPA, schools must maintain direct control over education records and ensure their vendors use reasonable safeguards. But if the vendor misuses data, parents typically have no direct legal claim against the company — their recourse runs through the district, with all the friction that implies.
The consequence: a breach or misuse leaves you negotiating with the same board that bought the system. The federal Student Privacy Policy Office exists precisely because these arrangements go wrong — and parents rarely find out until after they do. U.S. Student Privacy Policy Office
Surveillance isn't just a policy problem. It's a lesson.
The problem: every timed bathroom trip, flag, and encounter block transmits the same curriculum: the answer to surveillance is compliance, not rights. Children learn that being watched and calculated is normal.
The consequence: that lesson outlasts any school year. It is why this campaign is called We Lost the Fourth — and why the board's decision is about more than an app. It's about whether kids grow up believing the Fourth Amendment applies to them at all. The Washington Post investigation
Behavioral profiles built without parent knowledge
In federal lawsuits over these systems, parents have pointed out that digital pass software is a behavioral monitoring tool that tracks human movement and uses algorithms to flag students for "psychological patterns." The system can flag your child for taking "too many mental breaks" or "spending too long in the bathroom," yet parents are never notified that automatic behavioral profiles are being built against their children.
The classroom chaos & interrupted learning
Instead of a student quietly taking a wooden pass, teachers must stop mid-sentence, walk across the room to their computer, log into a dashboard, and manually approve or deny a pass. If they are busy helping another student, the child who needs the bathroom is forced to wait indefinitely.
Basic medical needs denied by an algorithm
Civil liberties groups like the New York Civil Liberties Union have fiercely condemned this technology, questioning why a student going to the bathroom requires digital surveillance. A student with a medical condition or bathroom anxiety can be actively denied access by strict limits and hard caps — a computer program overriding a biological need.
The bathroom-pass limits One school day. Three passes. Do the math.
How a normal day burns through every pass before lunch — and the documented caps schools are actually enforcing.
One school day. Three passes. Do the math.
Here at West Essex, Securly Pass is set to allow only three hall passes per day — and every reason for leaving the room counts against the same three: the bathroom, the locker, the nurse, the library, a loaner laptop, a worksheet, or a project sitting in another teacher's room.
passes allowed for the whole day — bathroom included
hours per school day (395 minutes) with no reset
bathroom trips left after three ordinary educational errands
A completely normal day, using passes exactly as intended
| When | What the student legitimately needs | Pass used |
|---|---|---|
| Period 2 | A worksheet was left in another teacher's room — the student goes to pick it up | 1 of 3 |
| Period 4 | The assigned laptop is dead — the student goes to the library for a loaner | 2 of 3 |
| Period 5 | Project materials for sixth period are still in the locker | 3 of 3 |
| Periods 6–9 | Bathroom. Nurse. Water. Anything at all. | Denied — no passes left |
That student did nothing wrong and used every pass for education — yet from mid-morning to the end of a 6-hour-35-minute school day, the bathroom is simply unavailable. On an ordinary day with fewer errands, the math still means at best one bathroom break in the entire day — and for many students, none.
Now the body's side of the math. Urologists at the Cleveland Clinic say going about seven times a day is average, with a normal range up to 10 times — roughly every 2–4 waking hours for most people. A student told to wait four hours, five hours, or the full 395 minutes isn't being taught discipline; their bladder and kidneys are being used as a storage unit. For the many West Essex students who menstruate, or who live with diabetes, bladder or bowel conditions, or take certain medications, waiting that long isn't uncomfortable — it is medically the wrong call, and the school never asked.
Option A — hold it in: urgency, pain, and distraction now; urinary retention, bladder and bowel control problems, UTIs, incontinence, and encopresis later. The medical sources are linked below — this is a real, documented consequence, not a scare line.
Option B — skip the errand: no worksheet, no loaner laptop, no project materials, no tutorial. A student who "follows the rules" can fall behind simply because the pass budget ran out before a need they couldn't schedule.
A system that forces students to choose between their bladder and their education isn't a safety tool — it's a rationing system for basic human needs.
Sources: Cleveland Clinic — How Often Should You Pee During the Day? · Hopkins Medicine — Bladder & Bowel Dysfunction · Mayo Clinic — Encopresis
These limits are real. Here is the record.
Digital pass systems across the country already cap bathroom and hall trips — and the caps are the feature, not a bug. These are documented caps, each with its own public source.
| School / district | Documented limit | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Basalt High School, Roaring Fork SD, CO | 3 hall breaks per day (ID-scanned, timer starts and stops) | The Sopris Sun |
| Arrowhead High School, Hartland, WI | 7 bathroom visits per week | Local 12 / WTMJ / CNN Newsource |
| Parkland High School, PA | 5 passes per day (student-reported); teachers see your ID and restroom time | The Charge (PHS) |
| New York City public schools | SmartPass at 167 schools; tracks time out, missed class time, hallway "socializing" | NY Post |
| Mountain View Middle School, Beaverton, OR | Digital passes used to build behavioral records; parent sued over "flagging" | GovTech / OregonLive |
| West Essex HS & MS (NJ) | 3 passes per day in this district — bathroom included | Community reporting to this campaign |
Across the country the pattern is identical: a handful of students misuse hallways, and every student's bathroom access is rationed, timed, and logged. The coverage page ties each cap to what it does to a normal school day.
The health evidence What holding it in does to a student's body and mind
Peer-reviewed pediatric studies and hospital guidance on why children cannot safely go six-plus hours without a bathroom.
The medical evidence, study by study
These are peer-reviewed studies and hospital systems — not opinions. Each makes the same point: children need regular bathroom access, and forcing them to hold it has documented physical and mental costs.
Frontiers in Pediatrics (2019) — bladder dysfunction in children
In 17–22% of children, lower urinary tract dysfunction (LUTD) persists past age five — including voiding postponement, infrequent voiding, and overactive bladder. LUTD is tied to recurrent urinary tract infections, kidney scarring risk, constipation, and anxiety, depression, and social isolation. First-line treatment is teaching children not to postpone urination — the exact opposite of a pass cap.
PubMed: Fuentes et al., Front Pediatr 2019Scandinavian Journal of Urology & Nephrology (2002) — 4,332 Belgian schoolchildren ages 10–14
12% reported wetting or soiling — 8% daytime wetting, 3% faecal soiling — and "surprisingly few parents searched for medical help." Bladder-sphincter dysfunction in these children is correlated with recurrent urinary tract infections.
PubMed: Bakker et al., Scand J Urol Nephrol 2002European Journal of Pediatrics (2004) — risk factors for recurrent UTI
When daytime/night-time wetting, voiding more than 10 times a day, and nocturia occur together, the risk of recurrent urinary tract infections reached 60%. Infrequent voiding habits and being pushed to "hold it" were part of the risk pattern.
PubMed: Bakker et al., Eur J Pediatr 2004Cleveland Clinic — what a normal bladder needs
Going about seven times a day is average (a normal range up to 10), and a healthy bladder holds roughly 350–600 mL (1.5–2.5 cups). That means most teenagers physically need a bathroom every 2–4 waking hours — not once per day, and not zero.
Cleveland ClinicWhat the data shows
Sources: Fuentes 2019 · Bakker 2002 · Bakker 2004 (PubMed) — see the study cards above.
Related medical references: Hopkins Medicine — bladder & bowel dysfunction · Mayo Clinic — encopresis · Meta-analysis: risk factors for UTI in children (Pediatr Infect Dis J 2022)
What Securly's own documents actually allow
These are direct quotes from Securly's Privacy Policy (last updated January 19, 2026) and its Website Terms of Use. Read each one, then read what it means for your family. This is the language your school district signed.
"When Students do, we may collect identifiers such as user name or school email and other information related to the purpose of the Services (such hall pass or flex time requests, search queries, and information about how a Student is feeling)." — Securly Privacy Policy
What it allows: every pass request, every search, and even the "how are you feeling" check-ins become company records. A child checking in as "anxious" before a quiz is now a data point on a vendor's server — not a conversation, a record.
"we may collect information about a Student's online activities. This may include: web browsing activity (for example, websites and videos viewed or blocked, time spent on a website, links clicked, web searches, AI chat questions); social media usage, including social media posts and messaging activity; the contents of emails, blog posts, and messages; and online interactions with teachers including student/teacher chats, virtual raised hands, and teachers' response to distracted behavior such as closing a tab on a Student's device." — Securly Privacy Policy
What it allows: if the district also runs Securly's monitoring tools, the same vendor can read what your child types in chats, posts, emails, and messages to teachers, and watch which tabs they close. Nothing on a school device is private once this language is signed.
"Based on a Student's online activities, Securly may identify potential signs of anxiety, depression, cyberbullying, self-harm, and potential violence." — Securly Privacy Policy
What it allows: an algorithm — not a doctor, counselor, or social worker — gets to decide when a child is mentally unwell or dangerous. False positives can follow a kid around; false negatives mean a struggling child gets a file with no human ever looking at it.
"We may collect geolocation information (including geo-related elements of device information such as IP address) to determine a rough estimate of the device's location. Securly also offers Services that allow Schools to enable the collection of precise geolocation information, but only when school-issued devices are reported lost or stolen." — Securly Privacy Policy
What it allows: granular GPS is (for now) limited to lost/stolen devices — but IP-based location plus Pass's movement logs already build a close map of where children are minute by minute: which room, which hallway, how long, in what sequence.
"If the School does not ask us to delete Student Information or fails to specify a specific retention period, Student Data will be deleted in accordance with Securly's data retention policy, which requires us to delete Student Information when it is no longer needed for the purpose for which it was collected and in any case, within thirty (30) days after the School's agreement with us ends... We may retain de-identified and aggregate Student data for the purposes described in section 1.d above." — Securly Privacy Policy
What it allows: while the contract runs, keeping the data is the default — deletion only happens if the school actively asks or sets its own retention limit. Districts rarely do either. And "de-identified" copies can be kept and shared for research long after your child graduates. "No longer needed" is a promise with no watchdog.
"We may disclose Student Information to third-party vendors, service providers, contractors, or agents... We may engage Service Providers to perform services (e.g., hosting)... We may also use and share aggregate or de-identified Student data with third parties for research and analytical purposes." — Securly Privacy Policy
What it allows: your child's records are processed and stored by outside companies running data centers — and subsets of the data can be given to third parties for "research" you never approved. "De-identified" datasets are notoriously re-identifiable; there is no public registry of who holds them.
"subject to our contracts with Schools, provide news, special offers, promotions, and other information we think may interest you... Parent and Educator Information is often combined with Student Information." — Securly Privacy Policy
What it allows: your contact details — collected when you use the parent app — can be bundled with your child's school records and used to send you marketing, if the district's contract permits it. Your family's data is a business asset, not a private file.
"Securly will honor requests from Schools to access, correct, or delete personal information about Students, Parents, and Educators. If you would like to exercise any of your rights regarding our use of your information, please contact your School." — Securly Privacy Policy
What it allows: students and parents have no direct right to see, correct, or delete anything. Your only path to the data is asking the district to ask the vendor. If the school declines or drags its feet, the paperwork stops there — there are no individual privacy rights in this contract.
"We may alter the Materials and Services We offer You and/or choose to modify, suspend or discontinue this Website at any time and without notifying You." — Securly Website Terms of Use
What it allows: the vendor can change what it collects, how it processes data, or shut the service down entirely without telling you. Your child's school day depends on software whose rules can change with a silent webpage edit.
"If You are a parent or legal guardian of a Minor, You hereby agree to bind the Minor to these Terms and to fully indemnify and hold harmless Us if the Minor breaches any of these Terms." — Securly Website Terms of Use
What it allows: if a child violates the terms — say, by bypassing the filter or using a pass improperly — the parent agrees to indemnify (cover) Securly's legal costs. Adults are asked to sign away their own financial protection on behalf of their children just to use school software.
"SECURLY DOES NOT GUARANTEE THAT ... THE SERVICES AND THE WEBSITE WILL BE PERFORMED ERROR-FREE OR UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT SECURLY WILL CORRECT ALL ERRORS ... AND ... WILL MEET YOUR REQUIREMENTS, SPECIFICATIONS, OR EXPECTATIONS." — Securly Website Terms of Use
What it allows: the company that generates disciplinary flags for your child explicitly disclaims any guarantee that the system works correctly, is dependable, or will be fixed when it fails. Kids still face the consequences of its errors; Securly faces none under this language.
"You acknowledges that You are authorized to consent to Securly's collection, use and disclosure of Minor User Data related to minors under 13 years old, and by agreeing to these Terms, You grant Your consent to Securly's collection, use and disclosure of Minor User Data in accordance with the Privacy Policy, which may be updated from time to time." — Securly agreement language (terms page)
What it allows: for children under 13, the school district — not you — grants the COPPA consent. Parents are never asked, never notified, and never given a choice. The district signs away your child's data protections in a contract you will probably never see. This is the single most important line on this page.
Primary documents: Securly Privacy Policy · Securly Website Terms of Use · FTC: COPPA Rule · U.S. Student Privacy Policy Office · EFF: Student Privacy
Twenty questions every parent and student should ask
Whether a school uses Securly Pass, SmartPass, or any other electronic pass, these are the questions that decide whether a bathroom trip stays private. Take the list to the board meeting for West Essex High School and West Essex Middle School and ask that every answer be put on the record before the October 1st deadline.
- Exactly what information does the system record?
- Does it record the time a student leaves and returns?
- Does it record the destination?
- Can teachers see a student's historical bathroom trips?
- Can administrators see historical records?
- How long are those records retained?
- Can teachers search for patterns in a student's bathroom usage?
- Can the system generate reports about bathroom use?
- Can administrators see how frequently an individual student visits the bathroom?
- Can students be restricted from using the bathroom based on previous usage?
- Are exceptions available for menstruation or medical conditions?
- Can students confidentially report a medical need without disclosing details to their classroom teacher?
- Who has access to the information?
- Is the information shared with third parties?
- Can law enforcement obtain the information?
- Is parental consent required?
- Can parents request records concerning their own child?
- How are records deleted?
- Does the school have a written policy governing use of the system?
- Has the school conducted a privacy impact assessment?
What Securly itself says
It is only fair to include the company's own response. Securly states its digital hall-pass system is intended to improve safety, reduce hallway incidents, and increase instructional time, and it argues that digital passes can provide privacy safeguards compared with manual processes. Its privacy policy says the company does not sell student information and describes how it handles student data. Securly: digital hall pass myths debunked · Securly Privacy Policy
The gap in that answer: whether a school can access and analyze information is a separate question from whether the technology company sells it. Securly's own product page tells schools they can see "every student, at a glance," set pass limits per student, group, grade, or schoolwide, control who may get passes at the same time ("contact control"), and generate "customizable reports" to "identify 'frequent fliers,' and investigate incidents." The unanswered question is what your school does with that power — which is precisely why the twenty questions above exist. Securly Pass product page
"We believe schools have a legitimate responsibility to maintain student safety, but safety should not require unnecessary surveillance of students' bodies, medical needs, or private lives. Digital hall-pass systems can create detailed records of when students leave class, where they go, and how long they are gone. Even when a system does not explicitly record menstrual cycles or medical conditions, repeated bathroom-use data may potentially allow sensitive information to be inferred."
We are not claiming that Securly — or any specific vendor — intentionally tracks menstrual cycles unless documentation establishes that fact. Our concern is whether ordinary movement and bathroom records can become a proxy for sensitive information, and whether students and parents have meaningful control over that information.
Securly's privacy policy — audited line by line
This page walks through the real, current document: Securly's Privacy Policy, last updated January 19, 2026 — the contract language West Essex agreed to when it turned Pass on. Every quote below is copied verbatim from that policy. Open the live policy in another tab and press Ctrl+F (Cmd+F on a Mac) to find each sentence in the original. If you can find the sentence, you have found the risk. The section headings below match the policy's own numbering, so you can check each one directly.
Verify it yourself — exact phrases to search for
Copy any of these exact phrases into the live policy with Ctrl+F. Each is quoted in full and explained in the cards below.
- "such hall pass or flex time requests"
- "identify potential signs of anxiety, depression, cyberbullying, self-harm"
- "we believe it is necessary to investigate, prevent, or take action"
- "national security or law enforcement disclosure requirements"
- "Parent and Educator Information is often combined with Student Information"
- "opt-out will no longer be effective"
- "no data security measures can guarantee 100% security"
- "Schools provide consent for Securly to process personal information"
1. Who says yes for your child? (Section 1.b — Consent)
"By contracting for the Services, Schools provide consent for Securly to process personal information, de-identified information, and aggregate information about Students on behalf of the School."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.b
What it allows: the school district checks the consent box by buying the product — no parent signature, no family opt-in, no public vote. Why it matters: if the board keeps Pass, consent for every enrolled student is treated as already given. How it can be weaponized: any future feature the company adds is "on behalf of the School," so the district — not your family — is the only party ever asked.
"When Schools sign up to use our Services, the School consents, as agent for Parents, to the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information from and about Students."— Securly Privacy Policy, COPPA section (Sec. 1.a)
What it allows: for children under 13, the district acts as your "agent" and consents for you under COPPA. Why it matters: West Essex parents were never asked, notified, or given a choice — the policy says the school speaks for you. How it can be weaponized: the consent covers "disclosure" too, so the same signature opens the door to every sharing clause in Section 1.e below.
"Schools are responsible for confirming that they are authorized to consent to the processing of this information and for obtaining any necessary consents from the Parent or Student."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.b
What it allows: responsibility is pushed onto the district — but no New Jersey district runs a parent-by-parent consent campaign for hall-pass software, so in practice no family is ever asked. How it can be flipped: if a problem later surfaces, the policy's answer is "the School should have gotten consent" — the company's risk is written onto the taxpayer, while the data keeps flowing.
"note that withdrawing consent may result in Students’ inability to continue using some or all of the Services and/or features of those Services."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.b
What it allows: the only "opt-out" is losing access to school functions the district requires. Why it matters: a family that objects is told their child simply cannot use the tools a normal school day depends on. How it can be weaponized: pressure, not privacy: parents who raise concerns are framed as the ones "withdrawing" their child from needed services.
"Use of the Services, and any dispute over privacy will be governed by our contract with the relevant School, this Privacy Policy, and our Terms of Service including its applicable limitations on damages and resolution of disputes."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.b
What it allows: your family's only legal path is whatever the contract with the district says — a contract you will never see and never sign. How it can be weaponized: damage caps and arbitration clauses drafted by the vendor decide how much a parent can recover, even if the company mishandles a child's most sensitive records. The watchdog is the same company that wrote the rules.
2. What the system can record about a normal school day (Section 1.c — Data collected)
"we may collect identifiers such as user name or school email and other information related to the purpose of the Services (such hall pass or flex time requests, search queries, and information about how a Student is feeling)."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.c
What it allows: the hall-pass system is explicitly named in the policy: every pass request, every search, and every "how are you feeling" check-in becomes a company record. How it can be weaponized: a child who checks in as anxious before a test, or who needs a restroom pass late in the day, is now a data point on a vendor's server — a pattern that can be reviewed, reported on, and shared, not a conversation.
"we may collect information about a Student’s online activities. This may include: web browsing activity (for example, websites and videos viewed or blocked, time spent on a website, links clicked, web searches, AI chat questions); social media usage, including social media posts and messaging activity; the contents of emails, blog posts, and messages; and online interactions with teachers including student/teacher chats, virtual raised hands, and teachers’ response to distracted behavior such as closing a tab on a Student’s device."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.c
What it allows: if the district runs Securly's broader monitoring suite, the same vendor is authorized to read what your child types in chats, posts, emails, and messages to teachers — and to log which tabs they close. Why it matters: this is not a bathroom pass; it is a standing license to record a child's private digital life, and the policy gives it contractual cover.
"Based on a Student’s online activities, Securly may identify potential signs of anxiety, depression, cyberbullying, self-harm, and potential violence."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.c
What it allows: an algorithm — not a doctor, counselor, or social worker — decides when a child is mentally unwell or dangerous. How it can be weaponized: false positives follow a child around as a "behavioral" record; false negatives mean a struggling student gets flagged or ignored with no human review requirement stated anywhere in the policy. There is no clause explaining what a family can do about that file.
"We may collect geolocation information (including geo-related elements of device information such as IP address) to determine a rough estimate of the device’s location. Securly also offers Services that allow Schools to enable the collection of precise geolocation information, but only when school-issued devices are reported lost or stolen."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.c
What it allows: IP-based location today, precise GPS the moment a device is reported lost or stolen. How it can be weaponized: add Pass's own movement logs — which room, which hallway, how long, in what sequence — and the school already has a minute-by-minute map of where children are, with "rough estimate" location layered on top. The switch to precise location is one checkbox in one report away.
"Device information. We may collect information about Students’ school-issued or personal devices, including the device hostname, device name and model, operating system type and version, browser type and language, and Internet Protocol (“IP”) address."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.c
What it allows: note the phrase "or personal devices" — the policy does not limit device data to school-issued hardware. Why it matters: if a student uses a home laptop or phone for school work, the vendor's data collection clause can reach the family's own devices, not just Chrome books the district owns.
"For wellness applications only, Schools or Educators may provide information about a student’s gender, ethnicity, ESL status, receipt of special education services, and health, safety, and wellness."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.c
What it allows: medical and protected-class information — special-education status, health conditions, gender — can be handed to the vendor whenever a "wellness" feature is used. How it can be weaponized: this is exactly the category of data that turns a bathroom-pass record into a proxy for sensitive medical information: a special-education or health flag plus frequent restroom trips plus a "how are you feeling" check-in creates a file a school can sort, search, and share.
"this information may include the Student’s name, address, telephone number, email address, parental contact information, date of birth, grade level, year of graduation, enrollment, attendance, school schedule including extracurricular activities, and teachers’ names. In some Services, Securly will collect teacher work data including screenshots and student/teacher chats."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.c
What it allows: a full enrollment and scheduling profile — including parental contact details and even screenshots of teacher work — sits in the vendor's records. Why it matters: the same dataset a student scheduler uses is the same dataset that powers "comparative analyses" and third-party research shares described below.
3. What happens to the record (Section 1.d — How the Services use Student Information)
"Securly reports may relate to a specific Student or may reflect class or School-wide Student activity to allow Schools and Educators to conduct comparative analyses of Students."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.d
What it allows: official permission for schools to rank children against each other — who uses the restroom more, who leaves class more, who "feels" differently. How it can be weaponized: "comparative analyses" are how a kid who needs the bathroom at 2 p.m. becomes a "frequent flier" in a report, and how a teacher is handed a list of students framed as problems rather than people with medical needs.
"To comply with the law or legal proceedings, such as subpoenas, court orders, and other lawful requests by regulators and law enforcement, including responding to national security or law enforcement disclosure requirements;"— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.d
What it allows: student movement and behavioral records can be turned over under a subpoena, court order, or national-security demand — with no requirement to tell the family. Why it matters: there is no clause in this section requiring a warrant, a parent's knowledge, or a school's permission for government access. The daily record of your child's bathroom trips is legally available to law enforcement.
"We do not use Student Information for any commercial purposes not related to the provision of the Services. Specifically, Securly does not: Sell Student Information; Build Student profiles for commercial purposes; or Use Student Information for advertising, including marketing communications and targeted advertising."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.d
What it allows: this is the company's key reassurance — and it only covers one specific use. Why it matters: read the very next lines (below): aggregated and de-identified student data can still be used and shared for "research and analytical purposes," and the rest of the policy still permits disclosure to service providers, purchasers, and government. "We don't sell" is not "we don't share."
"We may use data that has been aggregated or de-identified in compliance with federal and state standards"..."For other research and analytical purposes related to the Services."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.d
What it allows: an open-ended "research and analytical purposes" bucket for de-identified data — defined by the company, overseen by no one named in the policy. How it can be weaponized: de-identification is reversible in practice; researchers have repeatedly re-identified supposedly anonymized location and browsing datasets. Once a dataset is "aggregate," it is outside most of the protections in this policy.
4. Everyone who can receive your child's data (Section 1.e — How the Services share Student Information)
"We may disclose Student Information to third-party vendors, service providers, contractors, or agents (collectively “Service Providers”) who perform contractually defined functions on our behalf."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.e
What it allows: your child's records are processed and stored by outside companies running servers and data centers — often the same facilities your tax dollars pay for through district contracts. How it can be weaponized: there is no public list in the policy of which companies hold the data, where they are located, or what happens to the data after a sub-processor's own breach. "Trust us" is the entire security section for this chain.
"We may also use and share aggregate or de-identified Student data with third parties for research and analytical purposes."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.e
What it allows: direct permission to hand student-derived datasets to third parties for research — with no list of recipients, no family notification, and no school-level vote. How it can be flipped: the same clause that lets a district "improve the product" is broad enough to feed data to insurance, actuarial, or AI-training operations that never signed a contract with your school.
"We may disclose Student Information to a third party that acquires or merges with Securly or that acquires substantially all of our assets (including as part of a bankruptcy proceeding)"— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.e
What it allows: a decade of student behavioral data can be sold to another company in a merger or bankruptcy — the "provided equivalent commitments" language relies on the buyer's own promises. Why it matters: remember Securly paid an undisclosed sum to settle the class action over school surveillance. Contracts like this are exactly what make a student-data trove valuable to the next purchaser.
"We may disclose Student Information to third parties (including law enforcement or other government agencies) to comply with applicable law or regulations, a judicial proceeding, court order, subpoena, or other legal process."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.e
What it allows: police and government agencies can obtain the records without a family ever knowing until after the fact. How it can be weaponized: a record that a child visited the restroom ten times in a week, or checked in as anxious, or searched for medical terms, is a record that can shape a custody dispute, an immigration matter, or a criminal inquiry — all turned over under the routine "legal process" language above.
"These matters may include any reasonable suspicion of child abuse or neglect or the presence of child sexual abuse material."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.e (child-safety reporting)
What it allows: mandatory reporting is real and necessary — but the policy triggers it from alerts generated by the company's own flagging system. How it can be weaponized: an automated "wellness" flag with no human review can become a state report about a family. The policy never states what threshold, evidence, or review sits between an AI alert and a call to authorities.
"we may disclose Student Information to third parties where we believe it is necessary to investigate, prevent, or take action regarding illegal activities, suspected fraud, situations involving potential threats to the safety of any person, violations of our Terms of Service, or as evidence in litigation in which Securly is involved."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.e
What it allows: the single most important sentence on this page. The trigger is "where we believe it is necessary" — a private company's own judgment, not a court's. How it can be weaponized: "potential threats to the safety of any person" and "violations of our Terms of Service" are broad enough to cover a student who vents in a chat, jokes about a teacher, or runs an app the filter dislikes. The company decides what is suspicious, and the policy gives it cover to share the file.
5. Parents and educators are in the file too (Section 2)
"Parent and Educator Information is often combined with Student Information."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 2
What it allows: the adult who downloads the parent app or emails the school gives the vendor contact data that can then be combined with the child's school record into one family profile. Why it matters: there is no wall between "the parent's data" and "the student's data" in this document — they are designed to merge, including for the sharing clauses in Section 1.e.
"provide news, special offers, promotions, and other information we think may interest you."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 2.a
What it allows: marketing to parents, subject only to the district's contract. How it can be weaponized: "subject to our contracts with Schools" means the district's fine print decides whether the company can market to your family using records that include your child's school activity. Parents may "opt out" of offers, but the data is collected regardless.
"If you would like to exercise any of your rights regarding our use of your information, please contact your School."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 2.c
What it allows: students and parents have no direct right to access, correct, or delete anything with the vendor. How it can be flipped: your only path is asking the district to ask the company. If the school declines, delays, or simply doesn't know, the request stops there. There is no individual privacy right in this contract — the "right" belongs to the district.
6. How long the records live (Section 1.i — Retention)
"Securly also permits Schools to set a specific data retention periods for each Service. If the School does not ask us to delete Student Information or fails to specify a specific retention period, Student Data will be deleted in accordance with Securly’s data retention policy, which requires us to delete Student Information when it is no longer needed for the purpose for which it was collected and in any case, within thirty (30) days after the School’s agreement with us ends."..."Securly also permits Schools to set a specific data retention periods for each Service. If the School does not ask us to delete Student Information or fails to specify a specific retention period, Student Data will be deleted in accordance with Securly’s data retention policy, which requires us to delete Student Information when it is no longer needed for the purpose for which it was collected and in any case, within thirty (30) days after the School’s agreement with us ends."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.i
What it allows: the deletion clock only starts when the contract ends, and the school — not the family — decides whether to specify a shorter retention. How it can be weaponized: during the entire contract, keeping everything is the default. A district that never writes a retention policy (most don't) leaves the data on the vendor's servers for years, including all the movement and wellness records this site documents.
"We may retain de-identified and aggregate Student data for the purposes described in section 1.d above."..."We may retain certain personal information as necessary to prevent fraud or future abuse, or for legitimate business purposes, such as analysis of aggregated data, account recovery, or if required by law."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.i & 3.k
What it allows: "deleted" does not mean gone. "De-identified" and "aggregate" copies can be kept and reused indefinitely, and even personal information can be kept for "legitimate business purposes." Why it matters: long after your child graduates or the district cancels the contract, datasets derived from their school day can continue to be analyzed, shared for research, and used to refine the company's products.
7. Security promises vs. reality (Section 1.g)
"no data security measures can guarantee 100% security"..."We cannot guarantee that our Services will always be perfectly secure, and we are not responsible for any lost, stolen, or compromised passwords or for any activity on your account via unauthorized password activity."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.g
What it allows: a written disclaimer against the company's own security failures — including "lost, stolen, or compromised passwords" — while the same company stores the most sensitive data a child can generate. How it can be weaponized: in a dispute over a breach, this language gives the vendor a contractual shield. The 62-million-record school data breach problem did not happen because students chose weak passwords.
"If we learn of a security breach that undermines the integrity and confidentiality of Student Information, we will notify affected Schools in accordance with applicable law, contractual obligations, and industry practices."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 1.g
What it allows: breach notices go to the Schools, not to families — and only "in accordance with applicable law, contractual obligations, and industry practices." How it can be weaponized: a district that wants to avoid public panic can sit on a notice; parents learn about a breach of their child's records secondhand, if at all. Nothing here requires the district to tell you your child's bathroom and wellness logs were exposed.
8. The same company's adult data playbook (Section 3 — Site Visitors)
"We may sell or share Site Visitors’ personal information to ad networks and AdTech service providers to assist us in targeted advertising (i.e., displaying advertisements on third-party websites) and to evaluate the success of our advertising campaigns."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 3.c
What it allows: for adult visitors to Securly's sites, the company explicitly reserves the right to sell or share personal information with ad networks. Why it matters: this is the same company asking for your child's most sensitive data. The "we never sell student data" pledge lives one section away from a clause that sells adult data — and nothing in the policy explains why the adult playbook should be trusted with student records.
"Clear GIFs (a.k.a. web beacons, web bugs or pixel tags) are tiny graphics with a unique identifier, similar in function to cookies."..."identify when our e-mails are viewed, track whether our e-mails are forwarded"— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 3.d
What it allows: invisible tracking beacons and email-forwarding trackers on the company's own sites and mailings. How it can be weaponized: a parent who reads, forwards, or clicks a school-related email from the vendor generates signals about attention and interest — the raw material of ad profiling — collected through techniques most users never see.
"opt-out mechanisms are cookie based; so, if Site Visitors delete cookies, configure browsers to block or reject cookies, or use another device, the opt-out will no longer be effective."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 3.d
What it allows: the "choice" offered to adults evaporates the moment anyone clears cookies or switches devices — which is exactly what privacy-conscious users do. Why it matters: the effective default is tracking, and "opting out" is a temporary, fragile setting rather than a right.
"we and our service providers may transfer your personal information to, or access it in, jurisdictions that may not provide levels of data protection equivalent to your home jurisdiction."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 3.h
What it allows: data can be processed in countries with weaker protection than the U.S. and E.U. standards. How it can be weaponized: once records cross borders, the protections available to a New Jersey family depend on the laws of wherever the servers are — and the policy itself admits that level may be lower.
9. They can change the rules without ever telling you (Section 4.a)
"We may change this Privacy Policy from time to time, so please be sure to check back periodically."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 4.a
What it allows: the policy is a moving document. How it can be flipped: the version West Essex's board votes on in October is not the version your child will be governed by next year. "Check back periodically" puts the burden on the people — parents and students — who have the least ability to monitor a vendor's web page.
"If we make changes that materially affect our processing of personal information about Students and/or Educators, we will notify Schools directly in advance, e.g., via email or as otherwise specified in our contracts."— Securly Privacy Policy, Sec. 4.a
What it allows: students are never notified directly, and parents are notified only about changes to the parent section. Notice goes to the district — which may or may not tell families. Why it matters: meaningful consent requires meaningful notice. This clause guarantees neither; it guarantees only that the school is in the loop.
The bottom line
"Read line by line, this policy is not a promise of privacy — it is a list of permissions. The school consents for your child. The vendor decides what is suspicious. The records outlive the contract. The researcher, the purchaser, the subpoena, and the ad network all have their own doors. The only question left for West Essex is which of these doors it is willing to leave open — and it has 30 days of public comments to answer."
Primary document for every quote above: Securly Privacy Policy — last updated January 19, 2026 · Securly Website Terms of Use · FTC: COPPA Rule · U.S. Student Privacy Policy Office · EFF: Student Privacy. Open the live policy and press Ctrl+F (or Cmd+F) to verify any quote on this page — every phrase above is copied verbatim from the current policy.
Next, read who is paying for the data centers and who pays the legal bills when this goes wrong: The Money Trail →. Then use Take Action to put your concern on the record before October 1st.
Who actually pays for this? You do.
Securly Pass is not free. The district buys it with public money, and the records it keeps are stored in data centers your tax dollars pay to run. When the surveillance ends up in court, the same taxpayers are handed the bill again.
1. You already paid for the company's last lawsuit.
Parents sued Securly over allegations it collected and sold student location and video-viewing data. Bloomberg Law reports the company agreed to pay an undisclosed sum to end the school-spying suit; THE Journal described the case as one of unauthorized collection and sale of that data. Bloomberg Law · THE Journal
Now follow the money: districts pay insurance premiums, legal retainers, and deductible-style costs out of the same budget that pays teachers. Every dollar of the settlement, and every dollar of defense, is a public dollar. The parents who sued were never told their children were being tracked — and the taxpayers who fund the district are expected to cover both sides of the fight.
2. Your tax dollars are storing the surveillance.
Under its own privacy policy, Securly stores and processes Student Information through third-party service providers — including hosting providers that run data centers. Those servers are paid for out of the license fees the district sends Securly year after year, and those fees come from local property taxes plus state and federal aid. Translated directly: your tax dollars pay to keep an ongoing record of every bathroom trip, pass request, and hallway crossing in a private company's cloud. Securly Privacy Policy
The retention language matters here: deletion is not automatic while the contract runs — the district must actively ask for it or set its own limits — and "de-identified" copies can be kept and shared for research afterward. The storage bill never stops, and neither does the record.
3. In New Jersey, this story is already playing out.
Student journalists at New Jersey's CHS Courier covered a Securly rollout and the privacy concerns that followed, echoing the same alarms raised nationwide. Our own district is part of the same wave: local boards use public money to buy these systems while the federal Student Privacy Policy Office warns schools about the risks of handing student data to vendors. CHS Courier (NJ) · U.S. Student Privacy Policy Office
If it sounds far away, it isn't: the board is meeting now to decide this system's future here, after the backlash from our own students and parents. Every day the contract runs, more community money buys more surveillance of community kids.
That is why the board meeting matters. Complaints must be on record before October 1st to count. You can submit a complaint in under two minutes — the board is deciding whether your tax dollars keep funding this system.
"Securly Pass" is e-hallpass under a new name.
If you've heard complaints about "e-hallpass" before, this is the same software. Most of the lawsuits and news coverage below were filed under that earlier name.
Eduspire Solutions built e-hallpass in 2019. Securly — a much larger student-surveillance company — acquired Eduspire in late 2022 and folded the product into its own platform under the Securly Pass name. Source: EdTechReview · Securly landing page
Edtech monitoring lacks the nuance of human judgment — the data trails it captures can lead to severe consequences for the students it's supposed to protect.
This isn't hypothetical. Families have already sued.
Privacy advocates, parent groups, and courts nationwide have pushed back on 24/7 student tracking software — Securly included. Student-led petitions calling on districts to remove it have gathered tens of thousands of signatures on platforms like Change.org and iPetitions.
California class-action: unauthorized location & video tracking
Two California parents sued Securly, alleging it collected their children's geolocation data and video-watching history from school Chromebooks and shared it with advertisers, without notice or consent.
K-12 Dive: the filingThe case settled — Securly agreed to pay
A federal magistrate recommended approval of a settlement in which Securly agreed to pay an undisclosed sum and change certain practices.
Bloomberg Law: the settlement"Bathroom Big Brother"
The Washington Post's original investigation into e-hallpass quoted a privacy attorney warning parents about what the system tracks and how little families are told beforehand.
Washington Post: the reportStudent journalists are raising the same alarm
Student newspapers have independently reported the same lawsuits and questioned why a bathroom trip needs a data trail at all.
The Forest Scout: student op-edNew York City, 2026: 167 schools and counting
SmartPass was rolled out to 167 NYC schools, where it tracks how long students are out of the room, tallies their missed class time, and can flag hallway "unauthorized socializing." Students told reporters the system feels invasive and makes them rush; critics called the scope of bathroom monitoring excessive surveillance.
Gothamist · NY Post · Fox NewsOregon, 2025: a parent sues over the same idea
A Beaverton parent sued the district after a digital hall-pass rollout, arguing the system is a behavioral monitor that can "flag students" for interventions "without parents ever being told this is happening." The federal judge denied an early pause but let the case proceed — another sign these systems are ending up in court.
GovTech / OregonLive: the lawsuitPatterns, not passes: the "frequent flier" reports
In a Connecticut electronic hall-pass pilot, administrators used the data to examine patterns such as whether a student repeatedly asks for the bathroom during a particular class — and a principal described using those patterns to start conversations with students. Separately, Securly advertises that its Pass product lets schools know which students use passes, where they are in a building, and limit passes by student, location, or hallway.
Washington Post: the original investigation · Securly Pass product pageBeyond passes: the broader surveillance record
Investigative reporting by the Associated Press and Seattle Times and by WIRED documents AI student-monitoring software handling highly sensitive disclosures — mental health, LGBTQ-related information, even reproductive-health questions — and, in one case, thousands of sensitive student documents exposed. Senators have demanded answers from GoGuardian, Gaggle, Securly, and Bark.
AP / Seattle Times investigation · WIRED: laptops still spyingHartland, WI: seven bathroom trips a week
A Wisconsin high school's new electronic pass drew student backlash over its limits on when and how many times a student can use the restroom — capped at seven visits per week, per WTMJ/CNN Newsource reporting.
Local 12: the 7-per-week capBasalt, CO: "Big brother or the e-hall pass?"
A Colorado student newspaper documents the same 3-breaks-a-day limit used here, the ID-scanned timer, and the collective-punishment logic: everyone is controlled because of a few students' bad decisions.
The Sopris Sun: student reportParkland, PA: "Everything wrong with the e-hall pass"
The student editorial board catalogs the anxiety: "It's creepy and it makes me feel pressured like I feel so rushed"; the timer; teachers seeing your ID and restroom time; and kids who stop using the bathroom entirely.
The Charge (PHS): student editorial
What students, teachers, and reporters are saying
"If Your School Uses EHallPass, You Have ZERO Rights" (SnipeSnap) — a breakdown of how digital hall-pass systems turn private bathroom breaks into logged, timed, and flagged events.
Key points raised
- Dehumanization: students describe the constant tracking as feeling like being on parole or in jail, and many limit water intake or hold their bladder to avoid it — raising real risks like urinary tract infections.
- Data handling: the video asks how long behavioral data is kept and who on staff can access it, and notes that Raptor Technologies (behind SmartPass) previously left millions of sensitive records exposed online.
- Trust: the core argument is that schools should build trust with students, not scale surveillance across an entire campus.
"e-Hallpass Tracks Student Bathroom Usage AND Contains AdColony Tracking" (Not So Critical Update) — a technical breakdown of the app's Android build.
Key points raised
- Surveillance: the normalization of monitoring restroom visits turns school control into a "dystopian nightmare."
- AdColony: analysis of the Android APK revealed code from an advertising network — sloppy, unnecessary tracking for edtech involving minors.
- Weasel-word policies: privacy policies justify sharing data with unnamed third parties under the guise of "service support."
- Leak risk: stored data could be exploited or leaked (similar to the Twilio/Signal incident), and could track sensitive issues such as menstrual cycles or medical conditions.
- Accountability: officials often lack the technical expertise to vet software, so millions are spent on systems with severe, unexamined privacy flaws.
News report: when an electronic pass capped bathroom visits at seven per week, students pushed back — and parents and medical experts warned about what holding it all day does to kids.
Why this matters to West Essex
- Caps are real: this news report documents an actual weekly bathroom limit enforced through an electronic pass — the same kind of system now live in our schools.
- Students bear the cost: with only a handful of trips allowed, students say they ration water and hold it in rather than risk running out of passes for the rest of the week.
- A health issue, not a win: pediatric sources warn that routinely holding urine or stool can lead to urinary retention, incontinence, and encopresis — a drop in bathroom requests is a red flag for student health, not a success.
News reports, commentary & student testimonials
Commentary asking why public school funds are spent on surveillance instead of instruction.
Student testimonial: the anxiety of watching a hall-pass timer that flags you for taking too long.
Student testimonial: a first-day look at how the new bathroom e-pass works.
NBC DFW news: how one district rolled out the e-hallpass system and what students think.
U.S. students' records compromised. More than 62 million U.S. students have had their educational records and personal information compromised in school-related data breaches — driven by massive single events. [1] Security.org: Student Breach Report
What 62 million actually means: the affected records equal roughly 83% of the total current student population in the United States — or more than 112% of the current K-12 population. Because a single student's data can be leaked multiple times across different school districts, third-party apps, or testing services over their 12+ years in the school system, these historical breach totals quickly stack up to encompass the vast majority of America's youth. The sources below track and audit these events.
Estimate built from the student-newspaper reporting and teacher accounts linked on this page — not official district data. Each row is scaled to its own maximum so counts and percentages stay readable; exact values are printed on every bar.
The disruption loop
If a teacher forgets to digitally log a student in or out, that student is stuck. To let them leave, the teacher must completely stop teaching, walk away from the whiteboard, open their computer, and process a request — minutes of lost instruction for the entire class, multiplied across every lesson of every day. Every one of these small disruptions adds up to lost instructional time for the whole class, not just the one student who needed the bathroom.
The statistics behind this case file
Numbers from the studies linked below — every figure on this site traces to a public source.
The data, laid out
Every figure below traces to the public source printed under it. Where a number is converted or summarized, the chart label says so — nothing on this page is invented.
The scale of the problem
Breach scale vs. today's students
Wetting & soiling, ages 10–14
Bladder dysfunction after age 5
Recurrent-UTI risk
What the caps actually allow
Documented hall-pass caps, per school week
Daily caps are converted across a 5-day school week so the limits are comparable. The "typical need" line is the Cleveland Clinic's average of about seven trips per day.
Every capped school sits below a typical bladder's needs. Sources: The Sopris Sun · Local 12 · The Charge (PHS) · Cleveland Clinic · community reporting to this campaign.
Time is the hidden cost
A healthy teenager needs a bathroom every 2–4 waking hours. At West Essex, the school day runs 6 hours 35 minutes — with all three passes gone, there is no clock reset.
Even at the longest healthy interval, the school day runs 2 hours 35 minutes beyond the maximum — and a student whose three passes were used for educational errands waits from mid-morning until the final bell. Source: Cleveland Clinic; school-day length from community reporting to this campaign.
Sources & further reading
Don't take our word for it. Every claim on this page traces back to reporting, research, or a court filing.
News & investigative reporting
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Read it →School apps track students from classroom to bathroomThe Washington Post's original investigation into e-hallpass and what it tracks.
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Read it →Class-action lawsuit claims school security software violated students' privacyK-12 Dive's report on the California suit against Securly.
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Read it →Securly agrees to pay to end school spying suitBloomberg Law on the settlement outcome.
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Read it →Class-Action Lawsuit Says Securly Collected Student Location DataTHE Journal covers the same lawsuit and the data at the center of it.
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Read it →Securly rollout raises privacy concernsStudent newspaper coverage of a Securly rollout and the lawsuit history.
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Read it →The Hall Pass Problem: The Securely Pass system is an insult to the student bodyThe Harbinger's opinion piece on administrative overreach and restroom restrictions.
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Read it →Digital pass divided opinions across the student bodyLancer Spirit Online's news coverage of the divide over digital hall passes.
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Read it →Where Do We Draw the Line Between Oversight and Invasion of Privacy?A student op-ed weighing monitoring against trust.
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Read it →Everything Wrong With the E-Hall PassThe Charge (Parkland High School's paper) on the "whole process" friction: filling in requests, waiting for teacher approval, timer anxiety — and teachers who said they'd rather use paper.
2025–2026 reporting on hall passes & school monitoring
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Read it →NYC students, advocates push back on new digital hall pass schemeNY Post on SmartPass across 167 schools: timing bathroom breaks, tallying missed class time, and flagging hallway socializing.
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Read it →New Digital Hall Passes Track Bathroom Breaks, Gather Data in NYC SchoolsGothamist on SmartPass at 150+ schools: students sign out on a classroom iPad that times the trip, and a "hall monitor" view shows every active pass to any staff member.
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Read it →Digital hall pass tracking students draws backlash in NYCFox News on the same rollout: students say it feels invasive, schools say it improves safety and accountability.
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Read it →Parent Sues Oregon School Over Digital Hall Pass MonitoringGovTech / OregonLive on the Beaverton lawsuit: a parent alleges the pass system is a behavioral monitor used to flag students.
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Read it →Kids Are Back in Classrooms and Laptops Are Still Spying on ThemWIRED on school monitoring software, Senate scrutiny of GoGuardian, Gaggle, Securly, and Bark, and reproductive-health concerns.
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Read it →Investigating AI-based student monitoringThe Associated Press and Seattle Times found mental-health and LGBTQ-related disclosures in monitoring records — and an incident exposing thousands of sensitive documents.
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Read it →The School Hall Pass Is Going Digital. Is That a Good Thing?EdSurge's background on why schools adopt electronic passes — and what the data lets them do.
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Read it →3 Digital Hall Pass Myths Debunked (Securly's own response)The company's position, included for balance: no GPS, privacy safeguards, and its equity arguments.
Research, advocacy & privacy resources
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Read it →The Chilling Effect of Student MonitoringCenter for Democracy & Technology on the mental-health cost of 24/7 monitoring.
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Read it →Hidden Harms: The Misleading Promise of Monitoring Students OnlineCDT's follow-up report on disproportionate impact and mental health.
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Read it →Student Privacy Compass (Future of Privacy Forum)FERPA and vendor-contract guidance districts follow when they let third parties handle student data.
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Read it →Securly Privacy PolicyExamine what the company says the system logs, from its own documentation.
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Read it →62M+ student records exposed in school data breachesSecurity.org on the scale of education-sector breach events, including the PowerSchool incident.
Where the 62M+ figure comes from
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Open →U.S. Department of Education — K-12 Cybersecurity PortalThe federal government's official hub for K-12 cybersecurity policy, compliance directives, and statistics on systemic school vulnerabilities.
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Open →U.S. GAO — K-12 Data Breach Report (GAO-20-644)The federal watchdog's in-depth review of school data breaches, documenting the severe harms to minors from past system compromises.
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Open →U.S. GAO — Cyberattacks on K-12 SchoolsGAO's investigative analysis of how cyberattacks shut schools down, erase learning time, and cost districts millions in recovery.
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Open →K12 Security Information Exchange (K12 SIX) — Cyber Incident MapThe most comprehensive, state-by-state repository of active K-12 cyber incidents, with interactive data trends.
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Open →CoSN — K-12 Cybersecurity Framework & ResourcesThe Consortium for School Networking's district-readiness frameworks and annual technology governance overviews.
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Open →CoSN — Supportive Environments in K-12 CybersecurityGuidance for how district technology leaders set local risk boundaries and build resilient, protective environments.
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Open →UpGuard — Biggest Data Breaches in U.S. HistoryA timeline and scale analysis of major U.S. breaches, including the estimated totals from the Canvas learning-platform compromise.
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Open →GovTech — Ransomware in EducationReporting on the ransomware vectors hitting schools and universities, including the latest attack trends.
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Open →Higher Ed Dive — Breach Reporting Lag StudyResearch on how long education institutions take to notice and formally report exposed student information after a breach.
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Open →K-12 Dive — Instructure Cybersecurity IncidentCoverage of multi-district vendor vulnerabilities, including the Instructure (Canvas) incident affecting schools nationwide.
Vendor legal documents & federal rules
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Read it →Securly Privacy Policy (Jan 2026)The vendor's own document covering pass requests, "how a Student is feeling," retention, deletion rights, and third-party sharing — the language the district signed.
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Read it →Securly Website Terms of UseIncludes change-without-notice, parent indemnity for minors, and the disclaimer that the service is not guaranteed error-free.
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Read it →FTC — Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule (COPPA)The federal rule requiring verifiable parental consent for collecting data from kids under 13 — consent the district grants on your behalf here.
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Open →U.S. Student Privacy Policy Office (Department of Education)Official federal guidance on FERPA, safeguarding student data, and the obligations districts carry when they contract with vendors.
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Read it →EFF — Student PrivacyElectronic Frontier Foundation analysis of surveillance technology in schools and what it means for students' civil liberties.
Make a change. Stand up for students and our community.
Securly Pass is already tracking students at West Essex High School and West Essex Middle School today, and the school board is meeting to decide whether to keep it. Complaints must be on record before October 1st to be counted — so please act now, while you still can. Pick whichever option works for you; you can do both. Read the full case file at welosttheforth.vercel.app.
1. Email every principal & board member
One click opens your email app addressed to the superintendent, the principals and assistant principals of West Essex High School and West Essex Middle School, their main offices, and the full board of education — with a subject line and message ready to send.
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2. Send a personalized support email
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